Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

Kennecott Copper Corporation, a New York
Corporation v. Salt Lake County, a body corporate
and politic; Arthur Monson, Treasurer of Salt Lake
County; Milton Yorgason, Assessor of Salt Lake
County; The State Tax Commission of Utah : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James B. Lee; Kent W. Winterholler; Pasons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Respondent.
David W. Wilkinson; Attorney General of Utah; Maxwell A. Miller; Assistant Attorney General;
David E. Yocom; Salt Lake County Attorney; John G. Avery; Special Assistant/Legal Counsel; Bill
Thomas Peters; Special Deputy County Attonrey; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Salt Lake County, No. 870047.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1594

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAHSUPRaf«> U H T

IN THE SUPREME COURT

KTt

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

OOCKET NO-

m

* * * * * * * *

KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
a New York corporation,
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 870047

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic; ARTHUR MONSON,
Treasurer of Salt Lake County;
MILTON YORGASON, Assessor of
Salt Lake County; THE STATE
TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Appellants.
* * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT KENNECOTT CORPORATION
* * * * * * * *

APPEAL FROM THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE
* * * * * * * *

JAMES B. LEE
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 So. State Street
Suite 700
Attorneys for Respondent
Kennecott Corporation
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898

DAVID W. WILKINSON
Attorney General of Utah
MAXWELL A. MILLER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
State Tax Commission of Utah
130 State Capitol Buildinc
Salt Lake City, UT 84|

FILED

DAVID E. YOCOM
„
R
S a l t Lake County A t t o r n e y ^ l ® i a t 5 '
JOHN G. AVERY
,. „
Special
Assistant/Leqa^^<^si4mkxMtt,^
BILL THOMAS PETERS
S p e c i a l Deputy County A t t o r n e y
#9 Exchange P l a c e , S u i t e 1000
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111
Attorneys for Appellants

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
a New York corporation,
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 870047

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic; ARTHUR MONSON,
Treasurer of Salt Lake County;
MILTON YORGASON, Assessor of
Salt Lake County; THE STATE
TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Appellants.
* * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT KENNECOTT CORPORATION
* * * * * * * *

APPEAL FROM THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE
* * * * * * * *

JAMES B. LEE
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 So. State Street
Suite 700
Attorneys for Respondent
Kennecott Corporation
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898

DAVID W. WILKINSON
Attorney General of Utah
MAXWELL A. MILLER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
State Tax Commission of Utah
130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JOHN G. AVERY
Special Assistant/Legal Counsel
BILL THOMAS PETERS
Special Deputy County Attorney
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

TABLE OP CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

CASES CITED

iv

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

7

ARGUMENT

7

I.

THE COUNTY MAY NOT RECOVER TAXES FROM KENNECOTT IN THIS ACTION BY VIRTUE OF UTAH'S
ESCAPED ASSESSMENT STATUTE
A.

Utah's Escaped Assessment Statute Does
Not Apply to Property Which is Allegedly
Undervalued

7

The Majority Rule in Other Jurisdictions
Would Not Permit Recovery in this Action
by the County Under the County's Counterclaim
•

11

The County is Not the Assessor of Kennecott's Property and Cannot have Kennecott's Property Reassessed as Property
Which has Escaped Assessment

12

Sound Public Policy Dictates That,
Absent
Extraordinary Circumstances,
Utahfs Escaped Assessment Statute Should
Be Held Inapplicable To Underassessed
Property

14

THE COUNTY'S COUNTERCLAIM
IS FORECLOSED
BECAUSE THE RELIEF SOUGHT IS UNTIMELY UNDER
UTAH' S ASSESSMENT SCHEME

• 18

B.

C.

D.

II.

7

i

III.

THE COUNTY MAY NOT HAVE KENNECOTT'S PROPERTY
WHICH IS ASSESSED UNDER A NET PROCEEDS METHOD
REASSESSED BECAUSE THE ASSESSED VALUE IS NOT
TO ITS LIKING

19

CONCLUSION

26

ADDENDUM A

29

ADDENDUM B
ADDENDUM C
ADDENDUM D

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-608 (Supp. 1987)

1

Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-1411 (Supp. 1987)

1,2,7

Utah Code Ann. S 59-11-11, 1953 as amended

1,2

Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-309 (Supp. 1987)

2,7

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5, 1953 as amended

2,3

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17, 1953 as amended

2,11

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57, 1953 as amended

3,4,5,6,10,13
19,20,21,23

Article XIII, Section 4 of Utah Constitution

5,20,21

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-46 (22), (1974)

12,17

Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-802 (Supp. 1987)
Utah Code Ann. S 59-7-12, 1953 as amended

14
14,15,17,18

Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-1013 (Supp. 1987)
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-109, 1953 as amended

14
15,24

Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-309 (Supp. 1987)

16

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-52, 1953 as amended

17

Utah Code Ann. S 59-10-36(1), 1953 as amended

17

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-3 (1974)

18

Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution

iii

25,26

CASES CITED
Page
Bauer-Schweitzer Malting Company v. City and
County of San Francisco,
106 Cal. 643, 506
P.2d 1019 (1973)

11-12

Builders Component Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22 Utah
2d 172, 450 P.2d 97 (1969)

8,9,10,12,17

Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah
426, 174 P.2d 984, 991 (1946)

18

Davidson v. Franklin Avenue
151 N.W. 537 (Minn. 1915)

11

Investment

Company,

E.K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Whatcom County, 5 Wsh.2d
63, 104 P.2d 752 (1940)

11

Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451,
453 (Utah 1985)

10

Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County Bd., 657
P.2d 257 (Utah 1982)

15

Moon Lake Electrical Assn. v. Utah State Tax
Comm., 9 Utah 2d 384, 345 P.2d 612 (1959)

25

Nupetco Associates v. County Board of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, Tax Comm. Appeal No.
84-18-1600 (Utah State Tax Comm. 1985)

8,9,10

Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184
(Utah 1984)

1,3,15,22,23

Stafford v. Riverside County, 155 Cal.2d 474, 318
P.2d 172 (1957)

11

State v. Realty Loan Company, 96 So. 613 (Ala.
1923)

11

Tacoma Goodwill Industries Rehabilitation Center,
Inc. v. County of Pearce, 518 P.2d 196, 197
(Wa. App. 1973)

11

Thomas Executrix v. Commonwealth, 215 S.W.2d 546
(Ky. 1948)

11

iv

Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah
491, 15 P.2d 633 (1932)

20-21

Tradevell Stores, Inc. v. Snohomish County. 69
Wsh.2d 352, 418 P.2d 466, 467-68 (1966)

16-17

Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County. 64
Utah 335, 230 P. 1020 (1924)

8,9,10

United States S.R. & M. Co. v. Haynes, 111 Utah
172, 181, 176 P.2d 622 (1947)

23

v

JURISDICTION AND NATURF

s*

Utah Supreme Couit jurisdiction
under

v provisions

• o* * • ** - *

Thi s .i;,p

*

Monson

*

. Milton Yorgason f

*

:
c

*

- . - -

an uidei ui

Th

urt - Judge Timothy

judgment
aga;:

JI

UU Laube

ui

mi

.--ennecott . dismissing tha
Is

The County
s umma r

mc

lax uivis
R.

Hansoi

tin- ' D L ' I j ',s r ounterclaim

. w^

- -claim with prejudice.

.. -: -; ~\ *•

r\ • , > ^ .

missing that crossclaim * *x

the Count . •„-./•

*

the Commission, dis-

.- A

hv Kennecott

Kennecott's

paid

original

under
case

Corp. v. San Juai i Count y f

against

V 59-1 ;4.. (Supp. 1 9 8 7 ) ,
f

merly ljta- c -c- \ .11. ^ ji-j.i-11, 1953 a* -- . - Ldxei.

Comm i s -

; rejudice.
moucht

(1

* granted

appealing Judge Hansor i- ;• ;er w

s i o n " ) , on the County's crossclaim against

er>

, referred

("Kennecott 11 i, summary

Corporation
"

Arthur L.

J.>-*:V«-

to as "the County*"

granted plaintiff, Kennecott
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(hereinaf-
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> appeal

protest

iii chief
681

•

*ennecott
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for-
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by
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Alqom
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that resolution, there remained t\ le County"^ counterclaim against
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STATEMENT
1

\

the

Kennecott because of

County

obtain

additional

an alleged underassessment

taxes

from

oi nennec ot .t ' s

centrally
escaped

assessed

property

when

that

assessment, nor been omitted

property

from

has

neither

assessment,

for

the

years in question?
2.

Does Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17, 1953 as amended,

now codified

at S 59-2-309

(Supp. 1987), permit

the County to

force an assessment of Kennecott's centrally assessed property by
the Commission due to an alleged underassessment?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In May of 1982 Kennecott brought an action against the
County in the Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court
of
S

Salt

Lake

59-11-11,

County
1953

under

as amended,

S 59-2-1411 (Supp. 1987).
alleged

it

had

the

been

provisions

now

codified

(Rec. 2-8).

required

of

to

pay

Utah

Code

Ann.

at Utah

Code

Ann.

In that action, Kennecott
illegal,

excessive

and

unconstitutional taxes as a result of the enactment and implementation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5, 1953 as amended.
The

County

counterclaimed

against

Kennecott

alleging

that Kennecott's property was underassessed in 1981 and for four
years prior

thereto.

(Rec. 53-57).

The County

because of Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17, supraf

alleged

that

it should be permit-

ted to have Kennecott's property reassessed for these five years
and to collect

taxes based

upon

the

reassessed

value.

(Rec.

56-57).
The County
asking

that

the

also crossclaimed

Commission

be

against

required

-2-

to

the Commission,

value

Kennecott's

I

-

;.*.'-:

to

disregard the net annual proceeds assessment procedure mandated
by the Utah Legislature
a 1111 ended ,

in titan Code A m i. 3 3 r *

(Rei: 57- M I •
Kennecott

resolved tr^

•-•

*

?~-

cifically held that Utah Code
v" •

*

agains 4

the

county

. Rio Alqom this court spe-

A

. r«-~ ; •

1953 as amended,

*

Constitutions.

was

rc.o Aigom C o r p , v. San Juan

County

was

chief
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there remained only the County's

Counter-

claim a: ;: Crossclaim for resolution,
i ineco11 and 11 1 e Corun 11 ssio 1 1 thereafter brought Motions
for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the County's Counterclaim and Crossclaim.

(Rec. 725-727 f

742- 744)

The County

r e s pu J' 1 el e d w ,11 h a Mo t ion for Summa ry J u d g m e n t , along with s uppo r t ing affidavits and s u b m i s s i o n s .

(Rec. 771-86" 7 ).

1986, tuc uistrici
Commission'^

.ment s ''," 11 Ke 11 neco1.1. " s and the

Mnfjr^

County's M o t i c
Commission * ^

-

On November 26 f

f0,r Judgment
Summary
•

on

Judgment and

.

-

the P l e a d i n g s ,

on the

Kennecott's and the
.11 f 1 dav J t L- and 1 Dther

documents s u b m i t t e . ,- s u p p o r : c: - :.- County s Motion for Summary
Judgment.

-*-.

1 ,
f 1 y a 1 gurne 1 11 for ove 1 t * o and one-haIf hours,

the D i s t r I c t Co u r t denied the County's Mo t i o n f o r J udgme n t o ~. t - .*
p l e a d i n g s , granted Kennecott* s and the Commiss i<"i' \- *
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Strike the County's Affidavits and other submissions, and granted
Kennecott Summary Judgment, no cause of action, on the County's
counterclaim, dismissing that counterclaim with prejudice,
1005-1013).
the

(Rec.

The District Court also granted Summary Judgment to

Commission

on

the

County's

crossclaim with prejudice.

crossclaim,

dismissing

that

(Rec. 1004, 1013).

In his decision and ruling, Judge Hanson specifically
held:
. . . that the net proceeds method of assessing metalliferous mines and mining claims,
including
Kennecott's
mines
and
mining
claims, as set out
in Utah Code Ann.
S 59-5-57 et. seq., 1953, as amended, is constitutional. (Rec. 1009-1010) .
. . . that Salt Lake County's counterclaim
against Kennecott is an attempt to apply the
provisions of Utah's escaped assessment statute found at Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17 (1974),
to property which Salt Lake County alleges
was underassessed by the Utah State Tax Commission for 1981 and years prior thereto.
The Court rules that this attempt is improper
in that underassessment is not, and does not
constitute grounds for, escaped assessment.
(Rec. 1011)
The
granting

County

Kennecott

has

and

appealed

the

the Commission

District
Summary

Court's

Judgment

order
on

the

County's counterclaim and crossclaim, respectively.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The County asserts in its counterclaim that Kennecott's
property which is assessed by the Commission was undervalued and
underassessed
53-57).

in 1981 and for four years prior thereto.

(Rec.

There is no allegation that any of Kennecott's property

-4-

was not listed for assessment, i .e. was omitted from assessment
by the Commission, or that part or all of Kennecott's property
somehow escaped assessment.

(Rec. 53-64).

The allegations are

that the method of assessment which was applied by the Commission
resulted

in underassessment and undervaluation.

(Rec. 54-55,

58-60).
The County presented

no admissible evidence of any

escaped or omitted Kennecott property in response to Kennecott's
motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings, or

County's Motion for Summary Judgment.

in support of the

(Rec. 785-867, 1007-1009).

The only response by the County to Kennecott's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was an assertion that the methods employed
by the Commission to assess Kennecott's property resulted in
undervaluation.

(Rec. 774-783).

Part of this undervaluation argument was that use of
the constitutionally and statutorily mandated net proceeds method
of valuing metalliferous mines and mining claims resulted in
undervaluation of Kennecott's mine.

(Rec. 778-779).

The County

has never alleged or presented any evidence to demonstrate that
the Commission or Kennecott did not properly value Kennecott's
mine and mining claims under the net proceeds valuation formula
set out in Article XIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and
in Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57 et seg, 1953 as amended.
54-67, 773-784).

(Rec.

Furthermore, the record contains no allegation

-5-

of, or evidence of, improper, fraudulent, or collusive assessment
of Kennecott's property by the Commission,

(Rec. 54-67),

The County's only complaint is that the assessment by
the Commission of Kennecott's property did not produce the tax
"revenue the County believes it needs or should receive, and, as a
consequence, Kennecott's property must have been undervalued.
(Rec. 56-57, 60-61, 64).
The record contains no allegations, or evidence, that
the County sought to have Kennecott's property revalued by the
Commission when the County received notice of Kennecott's assessment from the Commission in 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 or 1981. Only
after Kennecott filed its tax protest action to recover a portion
of the taxes it paid the County did the County allege that it
should receive more taxes from Kennecott, because Kennecott's
property was undervalued and underassessed in 1981 and for the
preceding four years.

(Rec. 53-67).

In pressing this appeal and in arguing its position,
the County has relied heavily in its brief upon material which
was stricken by the lower court and which also was stricken from
the Addendums to the County's brief by this court.
material is in evidence.

None of this

The state of the record presents only

two issues for decision by this court.

Those issues are whether

or not the County has stated a cause of action when it alleges in
its counterclaim that Kennecott's property which is purportedly
undervalued

is property which has "escaped assessment" to the

-6-

extent

of

the alleged

undervaluation,

and whether

or not

the

County has authority to have Kennecott1s property reassessed when
that assessment

is committed to the Commission by the Constitu-

tion of the State of Utah and Utah statute,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The County has no authority to recover additional taxes
from Kennecott for 1981 and four years prior thereto under Utah
Code Ann, S 59-5-17, supra, because of an alleged undervaluation
or underassessment of Kennecott's property by the Commission.
The County may notr under the procedure and guise of a
Counterclaim

or a Crossclaim

in a Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-1411

(Supp. 1987) tax protest action, obtain a reassessment or revaluation of Kennecottfs property by the Commission.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COUNTY MAY NOT RECOVER TAXES
FROM
KENNECOTT IN THIS ACTION BY VIRTUE OF UTAH'S
ESCAPED ASSESSMENT STATUTE
A.

Utah's Escaped Assessment Statute Does Not
Apply
to
Property
Which
is
Allegedly
Undervalued.
As is pointed out above, the County relies upon Utah

Code

Ann.

S

S 59-2-309

59-5-17

(1974),

(Supp. 1987),

now

found

in asserting

at

Utah

its counterclaim.

statute, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
Any property discovered by the assessor to
have escaped assessment may be assessed at
any time as far back as five years prior to
the time of discovery, and the assessor shall
enter such assessments on the tax rolls in

-7-

Code

Ann.
That

the hands of the county treasurer or elsewhere . . .
Id. This statute does not define "escaped assessment" or specify
what property is deemed to have escaped assessment.

This court

has on two occasions examined this escaped assessment statute,
first in Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 65 Utah 335,
230 P. 1020 (Utah 1924), and again in Builders Component Supply
Co. v. Cockayne, 22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97 (1969).
the Commission

applied

the statute

In 1985,

in Nupetco Associates v.

County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Appeal No,
84-18-1600.

A copy of the Commission's decision in Nupetco Asso-

ciates is attached as Addendum A to this brief.

(Rec. 737-740).

In Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County, supra,
this court applied Laws of Utah 1917 S 5908, the predecessor
statute to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-17, supra.

The plaintiff in

Union Portland failed to report all of its property in its annual
statement to the State Board of Equalization.

Id. at 1020. The

omitted property was later assessed in a tax levy.

Id.

This

court held as follows:
Our statute which clearly indicates that, if
for any reason, property is omitted from the
assessment roll, or has not been assessed in
the regular order or at the time contemplated
by law, it shall nevertheless be assessed.
Comp. Laws of Utah 1917 S 5908. . . .
Id. at 1022.

It is "the duty of the local assessor to assess

property not listed for taxation . . . "

Id.

This language by

the Utah Supreme Court shows that only property omitted from the

-8-

tax

rolls, or which

has

not

been

"listed

for

taxation,"

has

escaped assessment.
The court in Builders Component Supply Co, v. Cockayne,
22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97 (1969), construed the current Utah
escaped assessment statute.
court,

should

be

All tax statutes, according to the

"construed

favorably

strictly against the taxing authority."
court determined

that

where

"there

has

to

the

taxpayer

and

450 P.2d at 99.

The

never

been

a previous

assessment [of plaintiff's property] and [plaintiff] had paid no
taxes thereon" the statute imposed a duty upon the assessor to
tax the property.
states:

"that

Id.

where

In reaching this conclusion the court

a valid

assessment

has been made

by an

assessor cognizant of the facts, undervaluation is ordinarily not
a ground for another assessment; and that property should not be
subject to double taxation."
extraordinary circumstances
sessment.
decision

The court

Jd.f 450 P.2d at 98.

Only under

is undervaluation grounds for reas-

in Builders Component

in Union Portland Cementf

stating

Supply followed the
that only property

which was not assessed for taxes at all has escaped assessment
and become subject to the escaped assessment statute.
The

Commission

Union Portland Cement

cites

Builders

Component

Supply

and

in its decision in the Nupetco Associates

v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Addendum A
to this brief.

In Nupetco, three acres of petitioner's property

were not taxed due to a clerical error.

-9-

Id.

The Commission

states in its conclusions of law that "property which has been
undervalued

due to a clerical mistake

property to be assessed or

in the quantity

in the assessed valuation does not

result in property which has escaped valuation."
omitted).

of the

id. (citations

"The subject property did not escape assessment . . .

but was undervalued,n so the Salt Lake County Assessor was said
to have acted

improperly

in reassessing

the property.

Id. at

page 6.
The County does not claim that any of Kennecott's property was deleted or omitted from assessment.

The County's coun-

terclaim in this action states that Kennecott's property escaped
assessment because it was "underassessed by the State Tax Commission of Utah."

Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d

451, 453 (Utah 1985).
(Rec. 54).
However,

Salt Lake County's Counterclaim at H 4.

This assertion by the County is denied by Kennecott.

assuming

underassessment

only

for

purposes

of

this

appeal

that

in fact occurred, this does not present a claim

for relief by the County.

The decisions in Builders Component

Supply and Nupetco specifically state that undervaluation is not
sufficient grounds for reassessment.

Under Union Portland Cement

and

assessor's

Builders

Component

Supply

the

duty

to

assess

escaped property arises only when that property is omitted or has
never been assessed.

-10-

B.

The Majority Rule in Other Jurisdictions
Would Not Permit Recovery in this Action by
the County Under the County's Counterclaim,
Utah's escaped assessment

found

in many

states.

statute

The majority

rule

is similar to that
in construing

those

statutes is that property is not open to reassessment as escaped
property simply because it was undervalued.

See State v. Realty

Loan Company, 96 So. 613 (Ala. 1923); Thomas Executrix v. Commonwealth, 215 S.W. 2d 546 (Ky. 1948); Davidson v. Franklin Avenue
Investment Company, 151 N.W. 537 (Minn. 1915); Stafford v. Riverside County, 155 Cal.2d 474, 318 P.2d 172 (Ca. 1957); E.K. Wood
Lumber Co. v. Whatcom County, 5 Wsh.2d 63, 104 P.2d 752 (1940).
The

Minnesota

"omitted"

and

Washington

to describe

escaped

property

assessment

subject

to

further

statutes

use

assessment.

Davidson, supra at 538; Tacoma Goodwill Industries Rehabilitation
Center, Inc. v. County of Pearce, 518 P.2d
1973).

196, 197 (Wa. App.

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17, supra, does not contain this

"omitted" language, and thus more closer resembles the California
statute.

Stafford, 318 P.2d at 174.
In Stafford, the court relied on the precedent set in

Davidson and E.K. Wood Lumber Co., as well as cases from North
Dakota, Alabama, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Illinois, when it ruled
"it is only where there has been no assessment at all that the
provisions for escape assessment apply."

Id.

at 174.

Stafford

was qualified by the California Supreme Court in Bauer-Schweitzer

-11-

Malting Company v. City and County of San Francisco, 106 Cal.
643, 506 P.2d 1019 (1973).
In Bauer-Schweitzer the city and county assessor was
charged with criminal misconduct while in office.

Id. at 1020.

The court upheld an order which allowed properties underassessed
due

to

the assessor's

experts.

id. at 1021.

property

which

has

criminal

conduct

to be reassessed by

The holding expanded the definition of

escaped

assessment

to

include

property

"assessed at an assessment ratio lower than the ratio properly
established by the assessor for a particular year . . . ."

Id.

at 1022. An assessor's criminal conduct is an extraordinary circumstance, which was contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court in
Builders Component Supply, supra, when the court indicated that
an extraordinary circumstance constitutes sufficient grounds for
a second assessment of the property.

Builders Component Supply,

supra, at 98.
Because Utah follows the rule that property which is
underassessed

is not the same as property which has escaped

assessment, Kennecott's property may not be reassessed, and the
County cannot recover on its Counterclaim.
C.

The County is Not the Assessor of Kennecott's
Property and Cannot have Kennecott's Property
Reassessed as Property Which has Escaped
Assessment.
Utah Code Annotated S 59-5-46(22), (1974), clearly com-

mits to the Commission the power and authority to correct any
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assessment

made

by

it when

that

assessment

is

improper.

It

states as follows:
To correct any error in any assessment made
by it at any time before the tax is paid
thereon and report such correction to the
county auditor, who shall thereupon enter the
same upon the assessment roll.
Nowhere

in Utah statute

is the county assessor given

any authority whatsoever to correct any assessment made by the
Commission upon property which, by statute and the constitution,
the Commission

is required to assess.

Kennecott's property is

mining property and as such it is assessed under the Utah Constitution and Utah Statute by the Commission.

The County Assessor

has no authority to assess Kennecott's property.

As a result,

any erroneous assessment can only be corrected by the original
assessor, i.e. the Commission, and may not be corrected by the
county assessor.
granting

Thus, Utah Code Annotated

authority

to

the County

Assessor

S 59-5-17, supra,
to

assess

property

which has escaped assessment as far back as five years prior to
the time of discovery, does not apply so as to permit the County,
or the County Assessor, to have Kennecott's property reassessed.
The only body which may correct an assessment, or which
may require property which has escaped assessment to be assessed,
is the Commission.
to have Kennecott's
County

is not

the

The County simply does not have the authority
property
assessor.

reassessed

in this

Furthermore, Utah

case, as the
statutory

lav

clearly states that any assessment made by the Commission may not
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be changed by the County.

In Utah Code Annotated S 59-2-802

(Supp. 1987), it states as follows:
The commission shall, before June 1, transmit
to the county auditor of each county in which
an apportionment has been made a statement
showing
the property assessed and the
assessed value of the property, as fixed and
apportioned to the county, cities, towns,
schools, and other taxing districts.
The
county auditor shall enter the statement on
the assessment roll or book of the county,
and enter the amount of the assessment apportioned to the county in the column of the
assessment book or roll which shows the total
value of all property for taxation of the
county. No county governing body, acting as
a county board of equalization, may change
any assessment fixed by the commission.
Thus,

the

County's

attempt

to

use

Utah's

escaped

assessment statute to reassess Kennecott's property, which property has been assessed by the Commission, is improper and cannot
be allowed.
D«

Sound Public Policy Dictates That, Absent
Extraordinary Circumstances, Utah's Escaped
Assessment Statute Should Be Held Inapplicable To Underassessed Property.
There are sound policy reasons for holding that Utah's

escaped assessment statute should not apply to property which is
only allegedly undervalued, but upon which the taxpayer has paid
his taxes, and closed his books.

The taxpayer in this proceed-

ing, Kennecott, received its assessment from the Commission in
1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981, and did not protest or seek to
have that assessment changed under the Commission equalization
procedures found at Utah Code Ann. S 59-7-12 et seg., 1953 as
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amended, now codified

at S 59-2-1013

(Supp. 1987).

Kennecott

paid its taxes to the County based upon the assessment, and the
County accepted

that payment

based upon

that

same

assessment.

Kennecott is entitled to an assurance that its acceptance of the
Commissions assessment, and its payment of taxes based upon that
acceptance, will end any obligation for taxes in those years it
did not protest its assessment before the Commission under Utah
Code Ann. S 59-7-12, supra.

Both Kennecott and the Commission

are also entitled to the assurance that the Commission's assessment

is final unless the County protests that assessment under

Utah Code Ann. S 59-7-12, supra.
A

policy

of

finality

in

taxation

matters,

and

the

administrative and financial nightmare which ensues without such
a policy, is what led this court to give prospective effect to
its holding that Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-109, 1953 as amended, was
unconstitutional in Rio Alqom v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184,
196

(Utah 1984).

That

same policy of

finality,

coupled with

reliance upon the taxpayer's part, was the reason this court's
holding in Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County Bd.f 659 P.2d
257 (Utah 1982), was given only prospective effect.

In Moose the

court states:
Also, if the rule were to be given retroactive effect, the assessment of back taxes on
properties affected by this rule might well
result in an unreasonable burden upon all
those organizations and governmental bodies
associated with it. By staying the effective
date of our ruling in this case, not only are
court and agency resources saved, but time
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also is allowed for organizations affected to
make needed adjustments.
This correction of a misinterpreted line
of law should not and shall not work harshly
against the appellant here.
657 P.2d at 265.
For the same policy and hardship reasons enunciated in
both Rio Alqom and Moose, this court should hold that, absent
extraordinary or unusual circumstances, Utah's escaped assessment
statute, Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-309 (Supp. 1987), does not apply
to underassessed, as opposed to omitted, property.

In this case

to hold otherwise will reopen the assessment of Kennecott's property for as far back as 1977, ten years ago. Under these circumstances no taxpayer can ever be assured his responsibility for
payment of taxes has ended when his taxes are paid.

This will

create uncertainty upon the part of governments, the Commission
and taxpayers and may well work a hardship upon, and work harshly
against, Kennecott and other taxpayers.
Other courts in determining that their escaped assessment statutes do not apply to underassessed property, have stated
a policy opposing "double taxation".

This is considered to be

the effect of extending an escaped assessment statute to allow
reassessment, and consequently new taxation, of undervalued property.

In Tradewell Stores, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 69 Wsh.2d

352, 418 P.2d 466, 467-68 (Wa. 1966) the Washington Supreme Court
states as follows:
In Hammond Lumber Co. v. Cowlitz County, 84
Wash. 462, 147 P. 19 (1985), the assessor had
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levied taxes based on the value of the land
but had neglected to include a railroad built
on the property.
When he attempted to levy
an "omitted property assessment" to cure this
oversight, this court ruled that it was not a
case of assessing omitted property but,
rather, was double taxation and therefore
improper.

attempt

The

Utah

Supreme

to

apply

Utah's

Court

has

escaped

also

characterized

assessment

statute

underassessed property as being double taxation.
Component

Utah's

to

See Builders

Supply v. Cockayne, 22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d

(1969).

an

97, 98

Indeed, even the County recognizes the application of
escaped

assessment

statute

to

underassessed to be "double taxation".

property

which

is

only

See Addendum B to this

Brief, letter from Bill Thomas Peters to Salt Lake County Board
of

Commissioners

dated

July

20, 1981, at pp. 2 and

3,

(Rec.

729-736).
Fairness and equity also require that Utah's escaped
assessment statute be held inapplicable to undervalued property,
as opposed to escaped or omitted property.
require Kennecott

to challenge

It is not fair to

its assessment

within

ten days

after it is received, see Utah Code Ann. SS 59-5-52 and 59-7-12,
1953 as amended, and to require the Commission

to correct any

errors it makes in an assessment within eight months of the date
it assesses

the property,

59-5-52

and

59-10-36(1),

County

five

years,

see Utah Code Ann. SS
1953

under

as
the
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amended,
guise

and
that

59-5-46(22),

yet

allow

the

undervaluation

constitutes escaped assessment, to complain about, or challenge
an assessment.
For the foregoing reasons, sound public policy requires
that underassessed property not be subject to an escaped assessment merely because it is undervalued.
POINT II
THE COUNTY'S COUNTERCLAIM
IS FORECLOSED
BECAUSE THE RELIEF SOUGHT IS UNTIMELY UNDER
UTAH'S ASSESSMENT SCHEME.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1974) requires the Commission
to assess all mines and mining claims, all machinery used in mining and all improvements to the surface of mines.

This is to be

accomplished by the Tax Commission before the first day of April
of each year.

See Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-52, 1953 as amended.

Immediately after this assessment, the owner of the property is
to be notified of that assessment.

Id.

Thereafter, if an owner of property which is assessed
by the Commission is dissatisfied with the assessment, he may
apply to the Commission to have that assessment corrected, so
long as the application is submitted before the tenth day of
April.

See Utah Code Ann. S 59-7-12, 1953, supra.

If no assess-

ment protest is filed with the Commission within this time frame,
the assessment becomes final and a later assertion in a lawsuit
that the assessment was improper is foreclosed.

See Crystal Car

Line v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984, 991
(1946).
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The basis and thrust of the County's Counterclaim is
that it is entitled to additional taxes from Kennecott because
Kennecott's property was allegedly underassessed in 1981 and for
four

years prior

thereto.

Yet

the County did

not protest

Kennecott's assessment before the Commission under Utah Code Ann.
S 59-7-12, supray as Kennecott was required to do had Kennecott
desired to protest that assessment.

Certainly, if Kennecott is

required to protest its assessment to the Commission in order to
have Kennecott's property reassessed, then the County should also
be required to proceed in the same manner if it desires to have
Kennecott's property assessed at a higher level so as to collect
additional taxes.
POINT III
THE COUNTY MAY NOT HAVE KENNECOTT'S PROPERTY
WHICH IS ASSESSED UNDER A NET PROCEEDS METHOD
REASSESSED BECAUSE THE ASSESSED VALUE IS NOT
TO ITS LIKING.
The County alleges that Kennecott's mining claims were
undervalued for 1981 and four years prior thereto as a result of
the net proceeds assessment of Kennecott's mining property by the
Commission under Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57, 1953 as amended.

The

County then asserts it should be allowed to have these mining
claims reassessed according to a mysterious formula the County
has devised which does not comply with the requirements for
assessment of mines specified in Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57, 1953,
as amended.
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There is no allegation by the County that the assessment of Kennecott's mining claims and mining property was accomplished in any fashion other than that specified in those statutes relating

to the assessment of mines under the net annual

proceeds formula.

See Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57 et. sea., supra.

The 'County's counterclaim

is that the assessment of Kennecott's

mining claims under the net annual proceeds formula results in
what the County considers to be an underassessment because this
net annual proceeds assessment produces an inappropriate value.
The County ignores Article XIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution in raising this point, which specifies as follows:
All metalliferous mines or mining claims,
both placer and rock in place, shall be
assessed as the Legislature shall provide;
but the basis and multiple now used in determining the value of metalliferous mines for
taxation purposes and the additional assessed
value of $5.00 per acre thereof shall not be
changed before January 1, 1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided by law.
This

provision

requires

that

Kennecott's

assessed according to the net proceeds formula.

mine

be

The Utah Supreme

Court, in construing this constitutional provision, and the statute implementing that provision which was the predecessor to the
current net proceeds formula found in Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57,
et. seq., supra, stated

in Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah

County. 80 Utah 491, 15 P.2d 633 (1932), as follows:
The constitution indicated general principles
specifying
what
the
general
assessments
should be, but did not lay down rules by
means of which those principles became effective.
This was left to the legislature.
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There is a limitation in the constitution to
the effect that all metalliferous mines or
mining claims can be assessed only on the
basis of a value, in addition to $5.00 an
acre, to be determined by multiplying the
amount of the net annual proceeds by some
multiple to be fixed by the Legislature,
This necessarily limits the legislative power
to an assessment of mines and mining claims
as provided in the constitution. There is no
express limitation to prevent the Legislature
from making the constitution effective by
providing a method by which the assessment
may be made as applied to the basis specified
in the constitution.
Id. 15 P.2d 636 [emphasis added].
Thus, all metalliferous mines and mining claims may
only be assessed as specified in the constitution and as provided
by the legislature.

In other words, neither this court, nor the

County may change the method of assessment specified in Article
XIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and in Utah Code Ann.
S 59-5-57, et. seq., supra.
The thrust of the County's complaint in its counterclaim relating to the assessment of Kennecott's ore in the ground
is that application of the net annual proceeds formula found at
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57, et seq. , supraf by the Commission to
Kennecott resulted in Kennecott's ore having no value for some of
the years in question.

Again, this is not an argument that

Kennecott's property escaped assessment, rather the allegation is
that the value resulting from application of the net proceeds
formula constitutes underassessment.
recognize

that

under

certain

This allegation fails to

circumstances,
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which

the

Utah

Legislature

acknowledged

in

enacting

Utah

Code

Ann.

59-5-57,

supra, Kennecott's and other mining companies' unextracted minerals will not have positive value.
Additionally, this assertion is misleading.

The County

would like this court to believe that Kennecott paid no taxes on
its property during some of the years
paid substantial
1981.

taxes

in question.

Kennecott

in each of the years from 1979 through

In fact, Kennecott paid more taxes than any other taxpayer

in the County during each of those years.
In Rio Alqom the court recognized, when it upheld the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5, 1953 as amended,
that different

types of properties

and assessment methodologies.

require different

See Rio Alqomf

681 P.2d 188-89,

where the court states:
Because of the many different kinds of
property and the various factors that affect
their values, the determination of what constitutes equal "in proportion to the value of
his, her or its tangible property," under
Article XIII, S 3, cannot be made by application of any single formula.
Of primary importance is the determination of what valuation methods should be utilized, and that depends on the nature of the
properties to be taxed. Residential, commercial, transportation, mining, and public
utilities, etc., must be treated differently
because of the economic conditions that give
value to such properties.
Some properties
are income-producing; some are not.
Some
types of property sell frequently in an open
market and have a market value that may be
reasonably estimated on the basis of comparable market sales; some types of property are
rarely sold and have no ascertainable market
value based on comparable sales. The value
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valuation

of some properties may be strongly influenced
by general economic or market conditions,
while others are not.
Some may be "wasting
asset" type properties (such as mines and oil
and gas properties), while most are not.
Indeed, some properties may have a value that
is peculiar to the owner and to no one else.
See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake
County, 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938 (1952)
(where the issue was the valuation of a mine
dump).
The court has also clearly acknowledged
proceeds method

of assessing

mining

claims

constitutional under Utah's constitution.

that the net

is permissible

and

In United States S.R.

& M. Co. v. Haynes, 111 Utah 172, 181, 176 P.2d 622 (1947), the
court stated:
It is conceded that the statutory method of
valuing metalliferous mines for taxation purposes at $5 per acre plus a multiple or
sub-multiple of the net proceeds is a proper
and constitutional formula for determining
the value of
the mines
for
assessment
purposes.
The County believes the assessed value of Kennecottfs
mine and mining claims is insufficient even though that assessed
value was arrived at by proper application of a constitutional
assessment method mandated by the legislature in Utah Code Ann.
S 59-5-57 et. seg., supra.

Simply speaking, this does not consti-

tute sufficient grounds to have Kennecott's property revalued and
reassessed as having "escaped assessment."
The County argues that in the years prior to 1983 the
Commission rolled back the value of Kennecott's real property to
its 1978 level in contradiction to the statute specifying a 1978
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roll

back

which

was,

at

the

S 59-5-109, 1953 as amended.
property

that

was

revalued

time,

found

at

Utah

Code

Ann.

That statute mandated that all real
after January

1,

1978, was

to be

appraised at its current fair market value and the value of that
property rolled back to the January lf 1978 level.

In interpret-

ing the application of this section to property assessed by the
Commission, the Commission took the position that it revalued all
property assessed by it each year and that therefore, the value
of the property assessed by the Commission was to have its value
rolled back to the January 1, 1978 level.

See Memorandum to Mark

K. Buchi, Chairman, State Tax Commission of Utah, from Gary R.
Thorup, Assistant Utah Attorney General, dated October 18, 1983.
Rec. 833-41.

Under this interpretation of the roll back statute

the Commission rolled back the value of Kennecott's property to
its January

1, 1978

level.

At

issue

in this

lawsuit

is the

assessment of Kennecott's property through January 1, 1981.
years after January 1, 1981 are at issue.

No

The Commission acted

properly in the method by which it assessed Kennecott's property
for the years in question.
As is amply pointed out in this Brief, the allegation
by the County is not that Kennecott's property was not assessed
at

all,

but

that

Kennecott's

property

was

undervalued

and

underassessed as a result of the application of the roll back in
1981 and the years prior thereto.

Clearly, under Point I above,

the escaped assessment statute relied upon by the County does not
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apply and may not properly be used to have Kennecott's property
revalued for the years in question.

Under those cases submitted

by Kennecott as well as the County's Opinion as set out in Addendum "B" attached to this Brief, Utah's escaped assessment statute
does not permit reassessment of Kennecott's property.
Kennecott's property

is entitled to be assessed under

Article XIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Utah Constitution upon
the same basis and in the same fashion as is all other property
in Utah.
nothing

In assessing Kennecott's property, the Commission did
more

than

apply

its understanding

of

the uniform

and

equal clauses of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution so as to roll back the value of Kennecott's property to
its 1978 level as was done for all other real property in Utah
during the same period of time.

Under Moon Lake Electrical Assn.

v. Utah State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 384, 345 P.2d 612 (1959),
this is a correct and proper interpretation of the Commission's
role in enforcing the tax laws of the State of Utah.
It

is

ironic

that

the

County

is

asserting

that

Kennecott's mining claims were undervalued and that Article XIII,
Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution require that the court
ignore

Article

XIII, Section

4 of

the Utah

Constitution

and

increase the value of Kennecott's mining property under some mystical formula.

On the other hand, the County asserts that Arti-

cle XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution simply do not
apply

to

the

Commission's

assessment
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of

Kennecott's

other

property so as to compel a roll back to that property's 1978
level*

This is inconsistent and an improper reading of the Utah

Constitution.

The County is asking the court to increase the

value of Kennecott's property in one instance as a result of
Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution, and yet,
not to allow a reduction in value of Kennecott's property by
operation of those same constitutional provisions.
CONCLUSION
As is demonstrated above, underassessment does not constitute escaped, or omitted, assessment giving rise to a right by
the County to reassess Kennecott's property in 1977, 1978, 1979,
1980 and 1981 under Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17 (1974).

Further-

more, because the County, and the County assessor, are not the
assessor

of Kennecott's property, neither

the County or the

County assessor may invoke Utah's escaped assessment statute so
as to compel a reassessment of Kennecott's property.

Only the

Commission, as the assessor of Kennecott's property, has that
authority. Additionally, because the County did not challenge
Kennecott's assessment by the Commission under Utah Code Ann.
S 59-7-12, 1953 as amended, in any of the years in question, the
County is now foreclosed from such a challenge as a counterclaim
in a Utah Code Ann. S 59-11-11, 1953 as amended, tax protest
lawsuit*
For the foregoing reasons, as well as others stated in
the body of this brief, the decision of Judge Hanson granting
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Kennecott

and

the

Commission

Summary

Judgment

should

be

sustained.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /&^dav

of J k ^ ^ C -

1987.
4t*^2 g ^
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»(£

CENT W. WINTERHOLLER
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
NUPETCO ASSOCIATES,
Petitioner,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND FINAL DECISION

v.
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Appeal No. 84-18-1600
Serial No. 22-27-306-002

V^5

A Formal Hearing was held on this matter on October
23, 1985, James E. Harward conducted the matter with
Commissioner Roger O. Tew of the Utah State Tax Commission
presiding.
Respondent.

Bill Thomas Peters appeared representing the
Wayne Petty appeared representing the Petitioner,

At the outset the Petitioner requested that the
Request for Admissions numbers 1 through 7 and Answers to
Interrogatories 1 through 5, 11, 12 and 13 be admitted into
evidence. 'The Petitioner then presented testimony of Helen
Watson, Deputy Salt Lake County Assessor of the following:
1.

A portion of the subject property was sold

necessitating a change in the legal description on the county
records.

WELLER
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2.

During the change of the legal description a

typographical error occurred whereby 9.6070 was transposed into
6.607 acres.
3.

This occurred approximately April 26, 1983.
The Petitioner subsequently told the county

appraiser that the tax assessment notice was incorrect.
4.

The evidence was presented that a note was made

and the correction process began to take place on the
appropriate county record.
5.

Another witness testified that the value for ad

valorem purposes is computed by multiplying the acreage listed
on the building card times the value per acre which value is
then used for computing the assessed value and ultimately the
tax.

The number of acres used to compute the property tax for

the 1984 tax year was 6.607 rather than the actual 9.6070.
6.

Evidence was further presented that there is no

dispute as to the value, per acre, of the ground.
FINDINCS OF FACTS
1.

The tax year in question is 1984.

2.

The lien date for determination of value for the

tax year is January 1, 1984.
3.

The lien date of the subject property on the

building cards from which value is established for assessment
purposes showed 6.6070 acres of ground.

The 6.6070 acres of

ground was then multiplied by the value per acre of $30,500
arriving at a market value.
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4.

In reality, the ground was 9.607 acres which

resulted in a total of 3 acres which were not multiplied by
$30,500 to arrive at the fair market value for January 1, 1984
of the property.
5.

Such a clerical error resulted in property which

was undervalued.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The County has the authority to assess escaped

property at anytime within 5 years ending on the date of
discovery of the property which has escaped assessment.

(Utah

Code Ann. S 59-5-17; Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan
County, 230 P. 1020 (Utah 1924)).

2.

The Assessor with the consent of the County

Commissioners has the authority to correct omissions, errors or
defects in form in the assessment book when it can be
ascertained what was intended at any time prior to the sale for
delinquent taxes and after the original assessment was made.
(Utah Code Ann. §59wn_3 (1953)).

Procedures to correct

errors, omissions or defects are contained in the Utah Code
Ann. S 59-7-1 et seq.
3.

Propetty which has been undervalued due to a

clerical mistake in the quantity of the property to be assessed
or in the assessed valuation does not result in the property
which has escaped valuation.

(See, Builders Components Supply

Company v. Cockayne, 450 P.2d 97 (Utah 1969); Tradewell Stores

Appeal No. 84-18-161

Inc. v. Snovhomish County, 418 P.2d 466 (Wash. 1968); Leyh v.
Glass, 508 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1973); People ex. rel. Schuler v.
Chapman, 19 N.E.2d 351 (111 1939); and Chicago Gravel Company
v. Rosewell, 455 N.E.2d 120, afjjd, 469 N.E.2d 1098 (111.
1983)).
4.

Because this is not escaped property, there has

been a failure of the Respondent to comply with the
reassessment provisions of the Utah Code.
5.

Because the error in the number of acres which

resulted in undervaluing the property

was discovered

subsequent to the time the tax was levied and paid by the
Petitioner, the Board of Equalization cannot now go back and
assess

3 acres as if they were escaped property.
FINAL DECISION
Based upon the foregoing, it is the Decision of the

Utah State Tax Commission that:
1.

Three acres of the subject property did not

escape assessment for the tax year January 1, 1984, but were
undervalued.
2.

The action of the Salt Lake County Assessor was

improper in assessing the property and giving notice thereon.
3.

The action of the County Board of Equalization

denied Petitioner of due process and equal protection of the
lav.
Therefore, the Decision of the Salt Lake County Board
of Equalization is reversed

kppeal No. 84-18.-161

DATED this

^g7. day of

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.
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'Joe B. Pacheco *
Commissioner

Rofle^/O. Tew
Commissioner
*
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Chief Deputy Couniy Attorney

Honorable Board of County Commissioners
Room 407, City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ATTN:

William E. Dunn, Chairman
RE:

Reassessment of Properties for Prior Years Brown Subdivision, e^ al.

Dear Commissioners:
This opinion is written in response to numerous
inquiries concerning the actions of the Salt Lake County
Assessor's Office in assessing back taxes to properties that
had been previously assessed and the taxes have been paid
but in a subsequent year they were determined to be inaccurate.
In reassessing these properties previously
assessed, the Salt Lake County Assessor was moving under the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-17, which
sets forth in specificity the duties of the Assessor when he
discovers a piece of property which has "escaped
assessment." At the present time, the writer is unaware of
any Utah cases directly answering the question. However,
there are Utah cases which do reflect the attitudes of the
Court in similar situations and based upon those decisions
it is the conclusion of this Office that once an assessment
has been made, the taxes levied and the monies paid, the
Assessor is without tne authority to reassess the property
as having been f,escaped.H
In the Utah Supreme Court Case of Builders
Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 450 P2d 97 (Utah-1969)
the Utah Supreme Court said that "Statutes imposing taxes
and prescribing tax procedures should generally be construed
favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing
authority" reconizing that this is a long understood policy..
That Court went on to state that "...where a valid
assessment has been made, by an assessor, cognizant of the
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facts, undervaluation is ordinarily not a ground for another
assessment; and that property should not be subject to
double taxation.* It has been early held that property is
not open to back assessment if it was merely assessed at too
low a value or in the wrong county. . See Anniston City Land
Co. v. State, 64 So 110 (Ala-1913); State v. Reality Loan
Co., 96 So 613 (Ala-1923) and Thomas Executrix v.
Commonwealth, 215 SW2d 546 (Ky-1948). On the other hand,
clerical errors such as omitting the final zero in calculating the tax or misplacing a decimal point that results in
a substantial portion of the property escaping taxation can,
under certain circumstances trigger a back assessment. See
Heuck v. Cincinnati Model Homes, 199 NE 698 (Ohio-1936).
Since the state of.Utah has not decided the
question directly, it is necessary to review the interpretative decisions of some of the other States that have statutes similar to the Utah Statute. In the case of Davidson v.
Franklin Avenue Investment, Co., 151 NW 538 (Minn-1915), the
Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota was required to
interpret a statute that is quite similar to the one found
in Utah Code Annotated, 59-5-17. That case involved a fact
situation similar to the .one in the instant case. In that
case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that •...this
statute gives no power to reassessr except where. Teal.property is omitted in~ the -assessment of "any year or years and
thereby escapes taxation.' * This is not a case-of omitting
property in an assessment, but simply of undervaluing it.*
Without mention of the word "reassessment" this Court said
that it authorizes a reassessment only when the property has
been omitted, when it has escaped taxation. The words
"escaped taxation11 or "escaping assessment" appear both in
the Utah Statute and the Minnesota Statute. The Minnesota
Court, in that decision, went on to say that to hold otherwise "...when property has been undervalued by the assessing
officers, but has paid the taxes assessed and levied, would
often work a hardship upon innocent purchasers of the
property." This position was also restated by the
California Supreme Court in the case of Stafford v.
Riverside County. 318 P2d 172 (Cal-1957). In that case, the
assessor attempted to reassess property previously assessed
for the tax year of 1949, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54. The property had been improved for the years 1947, 48 and 49 and
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the improvements were "well-known to the county assessor"
and were open and apparent to anyone. However, in 1954, the
assessor attempted to go back and collect additional taxes.
The county assessor was moving under a provision similar to
the one found in the Utah Statute which gave him the
authority to assess property that had escaped assessment.
The California Supreme Court reviewed the authorities from
the various states including the Minnesota case of Davidson
v. Franklin, supra, and made the following observations
"From the authorities cited, it would appear that it is only
where there has been no assessment at all that the provisions for escaped assessment apply." The Court then went on
to conclude that since the property had been previously
assessed, although undervalued, it could not be reassessed
as property having escaped assessment.
Thus, we see that the California Supreme Court, in
the case of Stafford, like the Minnesota Court in the case
of Davidson, has concluded that the word "escaped" or
"omitted" does .not mean the same thing as "undervalued." "
It should be pointed out, however, that the
assessor's action in the instant case is not without supporting authority. In fact, in a more recent California
decision* the Supreme Court of California appeared to overturn the .previous-position .taken -£y~rit in Stafford-." Thus,
in the case of - Bauer-Schweitzer Mal=t,' Inc. v. City and
County of "San Francisco, 506 P.2d 1019 (Cal-1973) the
Supreme Court of the State of California allowed the
assessor to reassess property undervalued in previous years.
However, that case arose out of a situation in San Francisco
County wherein a grand jury had determined that the
Assessor's Office had deliberately assessed certain properties below the applicable assessment ratio for the area and
had done so intentionally and was charged with criminal
misconduct in office.
In that case, the California Supreme Court
restricted its previous holding in the Stafford Case and
said that, to the extent the property has been assessed at
an assessment ratio lower than the ratio properly
established by the assessor for a particular year, such property had escaped assessment. The court went on to conclude
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that there was authority to make an escape assessment in the
amount of the deficiency for any year for which recovery of
back taxes was permitted by law.
This latest pronouncement
by California Supreme Court would certainly appear to support the actions of the Salt Lake County Assessor in the
instant case* As was pointed out by the California Supreme
Court "The Assessor is under a duty not to allow anyone to
escape a just and equal assessment." And was further
observed by the Court, the Assessor is obligated "Not to
allow anyone to escape a just and equal assessment through
favor, reward or otherwise."
As can be seen from the above and foregoing
authorities, there is no concensus of opinion concerning
what constitutes escaped or omitted property and what
constitutes reassessment. And, while it is admitted that
the Minnesota statute referred to by the Court In the
Davidson case is not exactly like the Utah statute, the
thrust of the statute seems to be substantially the same.
While the Utah statute does not use the word "omitted" and
simply refers to "escaped assessment," it is my "opinion that
the intent of both statutes is substantially the same. It
is further my opinion that the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, while not directly in point,
would indicate that-the.Utah Supreme Court would probably
follow the Minnesota court's approach.
Reference is made to the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in the Case of Union Portland Cement Co. v.
Morgan County, 230 P. 1020, in that case our Supreme Court
declared that "it is the duty of the Assessor ...to assess
property omitted from assessment when discovered." (Emphasis
supplied). The fact that this word has been used in
construing Utah Code Annotated 59-5-17 is further persuasion
of the fact that the Utah .Supreme Court would probably
construe the language of 59-5-17 to mean the same as the
Supreme Court of Minnesota construed the Davidson case. See
also Muscatine Lighting Co. v. Ditchforth, 243 NW.292,
wherein the Iowa Supreme Court held that property erroneously assessed with respect to the amount was not
•omitted" or "withheld, overlooked or for any other cause
not listed and assessed;" hence the County Treasurer could
not make the correction. Again, the statute in question in
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t h a t case contained the words "omitted p r o p e r t y . " This
p o s i t i o n i s f u r t h e r supported by the Supreme Court of the
S t a t e of Arizona and the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington.
In Leyh v. G l a s s , 508 P.2d 259, the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma made the following o b s e r v a t i o n : "Statutory p r o cedures for l i s t i n g and a s s e s s i n g omitted property is not
a p p r o p r i a t e for r e a s s e s s i n g or revaluing property which has
a l r e a d y been a s s e s s e d . " And in Tradewell S t o r e s , I n c . v.
Snohomish County, 418 P*2d 466, the Washington Supreme Court
held t h a t under a s t a t u t e r e l a t i n g t o Omitted assessments,
i n a p p r o p r i a t e v a l u a t i o n s may not be increased and the prop e r t y must have been omitted e n t i r e l y as evidenced by the
assessment r o l l s before taxes for the p a s t years may be
assessed.
(Emphas.is s u p p l i e d ) . The Washington Court went
on t o c h a r a c t e r i z e such an approach as a double taxation
q u e s t i o n as has Utah, in the Builder Components case, supra;
and said t h a t the fact " . . . t h a t t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n allows a
t a x payer t o escape payment of taxes as a result; of e r r o r or
o v e r s i g h t of the a s s e s s o r , or even because of his i n a b i l i t y
t o keep c o n s t a n t l y informed of new construction in his
county i s u n f o r t u n a t e , but i s i m m a t e r i a l . "
Based upon the foregoing a u t h o r i t i e s and a l i t e r a l
r e a d i n g of t h e - p r o v i s i o n s of Ut3h Code Annotated, Section
5 9-^5-17.f~ and "based "upon the previous opinion issued by t h i s
o f f i c e , i t i s . s t i l l the opinion, of t h i s office that once an
assessment has been made upon p r o p e r t y , and the taxes have
been pai^d, i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e and unlawful for the
Assessor t o attempt to change the assessment by t r e a t i n g
s a i d p r e v i o u s l y assessed property as escaped property and
move under Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-17, 1953, as
amended. On the other hand, if the e r r o r i s discovered
p r i o r t o the time t h a t the taxes are delinquent or have been
p a i d , the Assessor has the a u t h o r i t y to c o r r e c t such e r r o r s .
T h i s a u t h o r i t y i s found in Utah Code Annotated, Section
5 9 - 1 1 - 3 , 1953, as amended, which s t a t u t o r y provision allows
the Assessor to make c e r t a i n c o r r e c t i o n s in the assessment
book for e r r o r s or omissions. The p e r t i n e n t language of
t h a t s t a t u t e reads as follows:
"Omissions, e r r o r s or d e f e c t s in form in the
assessment book, when i t can be ascertained
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therefrom what was intendedf may, with the consent
of the County Commission, be supplied or corrected
by the Assessor at any time prior to the sale for
delinquent taxes and after the original assessment
was made/ (Emphasis supplied).
As previously indicated, this statute would appear to allow
a correction or a reassessment of property that was erroneously assessed if the discovery of the error occurred
prior to the time that the property became subject to sale
for delinquent taxes. This would, therefore, mean that if
an erroneous assessment is made and the taxes have, in fact,
not been paid and the error is discovered pribr to the sale
for delinquent taxes to the County, a correction could be
made. However, in those cases where the underassessment was
not discovered until after the time that the taxes were paid
or that the sale to the County had taken place, the authorities from a majority of the states having statutes similar
to the Utah Statute would not allow a subsequent assessment.
I should also like to mention in passing that in
the instant case, and in particular with the Brown
Subdivision, the Salt Lake County Assessor was acting pursuant to preliminary advice given by the undersigned as
Special Deputy County Attorney. That advice was .based primarily -.upon the. fact* :that the SupremeMTourt ~of. the State of r
Cali'fbrniaY in-approaching a similar-.problem,- had-drastically changed from its previous position and had allowed the
assessor to make reassessment for previously undervalued
property in subsequent years. This is the position set
forth in the Schweitzer-Malt case. However, upon more
detailed review and upon further review of the authorities
and a re-examination of the two Utah cases that would appear
to have a bearing on the question, it is the opinion of the
undersigned that the Utah Court would not allow a subsequent
reappraisal of property previously assessed upon which the
taxes had been paid. While the actions of the Salt Lake
County Assessor were certainly in the best interests and
welfare of all taxpayers in Salt Lake County and were geared
towards assuring that each and every taxpayer in the County
pays their just and fair share of the tax burden, it is also
apparent that, under the facts and circumstances of this
case, the action would probably not be supportable.
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Therefore, the opinion of this Office is that those
reassessments made by the Assessor's Office for the year
1981 of properties previously assessed but undervalued where
the taxes had been paid or where a preliminary sale to Salt
Lake County had taken place, should be cancelled, at least
to the extent that they relate to prior years. Of course,
any corrective action taken for the year 1981 is supportable
and can be taken until such times as the taxes are in fact
paid or the property is preliminarily sold to Salt Lake
County for non-payment of taxes.
If there are any additional questions with regard
to this matter, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned.
Best personal regards,

Ted Cannon,
S a l t Lake County A t t o r n e y
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cc:

Donald S. Savava

;

.- S~s~.**</>'

-'f\^'.t

. B i l l Thomas:.Peters--.. S p e c i a l Deputy - S a l t Lake
County A t t o r n e y

ADDENDUM C

59-5-17

REVENUE AND TAXATION

59-5-17. Property escaping assessment—Five-year limitation period on
assessment—Duties of assessor.—Any property discovered by the assessor
to have escaped assessment may be assessed at any time as far back as five
years prior to the time of discovery, and the assessor shall enter such
assessments on the tax rolls in the hands of the county treasurer or elsewhere, and when so assessed shall be reported by the assessor to the county
auditor, if made after the assessment book has been delivered to the county
treasurer, and the auditor shall charge the county assessor with the taxes
on such property, and the assessor shall give notice to the person assessed
therewith and the assessor shall forthwith proceed to secure or collect the
taxes as provided in chapter 10 of this title.

EQUALIZATION

59-7-12

59-7-12. Time for application to correct assessment.—If the owner of
any property assessed by the state tax commission is dissatisfied with the
assessment made by it, such owner may, between the third Monday in May
and the second Monday in June, apply to the commission to have the same
corrected in any particular, and it shall set a time for hearing such objections and may correct and increase or lower any assessment made by it, so
as to equalize the same with the assessment of other ptopeTty in the state.

59-2-803. Statement transmitted 'by county auditors to
governing bodies.
The county auditor shall transmit to the governing bodies of cities, towns,
schools, and other taxing districts in which the property is situated, or to
which any of the value is apportioned, a statement of the valuation of all
property as fixed and apportioned by the commission and reported under
§ 59-2-802. The statement shall be transmitted at the same time and in the
same manner as the statement is transmitted under § 59-2-924. All the property is taxable upon assessment at the same rate, by the same officers, and for
the same purposes, as the property of individuals within the city, town, school,
road, or other taxing districts, respectively, and the taxes, except the taxes on
car companies and on automobiles, motor stages, and motor transports, shall
be collected in the same manner and by the same officers as the other taxes
are collected.

ADDENDUM D

AKT. XIII, § 2

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Bee' 2. [Tangible property to be taxed—Value ascertained—Properties
exempt—Legislature to provide annual tax for state.]
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The property of the state,
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public
libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious
worship or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or used for
private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation. Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is held for sale or
processing and which is shipped to final destination outside this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no situs in Utah
for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by law
from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or otherwise originating within or without the state. Tangible personal property
present in Utah on January 1, m., held for sale in the ordinary course
of business and which constitutes the inventory of any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may be deemed
for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted. "Water
rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals
or corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall not be separately
taxed so long as they shall be owned and used exclusively for such
purposes. Power plants, power transmission lines and other property
used for generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which
is used for furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes
on lands in the state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the
extent that such nrooertv is used for such purposes. These exemptions
shall accrue to the benefit of the users of water so pumped under such
regulations as the Legislature may prescribe. The taxes of the indigent
poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in such manner as may
be provided by law. The Legislature may provide for the exemption from
taxation of homes, homesteads, and personal property, not to exceed $2,000
in value for homes, homesteads, and all household furnishings, furniture,
and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in
maintaining a home for himself and family. Property not to exceed $3,000
in value, owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the
military service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the
unmarried widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of
persons who while serving in the military service of the United States
or the state of Utah were killed in action or died as a result of such
iervice may be exempted as the Legislature may provide.
The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any
there be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt,
within twenty years from the final passage of the law creating the debt.
(As amended November 4, 1930; November 5, 1946; November 4, 1958,
effective January 1, 1959; November 6, 1962, effective January 1, 1963;
November 3, 1964, effective January 1, 1965; November 5, 196S, effective
January 1,1969.)

ART. XIII, § 3

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property—ExemptionsPersonal income tax—Disposition of revenues.]
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation on all tangible property in the state[,] according to its value in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such proprrty, so that
every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value
of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the Legislature may
determine the manner and extent of taxing transient livestock and livestock
being fed for slaughter to be used for human consumption. Land used
for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes, be assessed
according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the value it
may have for other purposes. Intangible property may be exempted from
taxation as property or it may be taxed in such manner and to such extent
as the Legislature may provide. Provided that if intangible property be
taxed as property the rate thereof shall not exceed five mills on each
dollar of valuation. "When exempted from taxation as property, the taxable
income therefrom shall be taxed under any tax based on incomes, but when
taxed by the state of Utah as property, the income therefrom shall not
also be taxed. The Legislature may provide for deductions, exemptions,
and/or offsets on any tax based upon income. The personal income tax
rates shall be graduated but the maximum rate shall not exceed six per
cent of net income. No excise tax rate based upon income shall exceed four
per cent of net income. The rate limitations herein contained for taxes
based on income and for taxes on intangible property shall be effective
until January 1, 1937, and thereafter until changed by law by a vote
of the majority of the members elected to each house of the Legislature.
All revenue received from taxes on income or from taxes on intangible
property shall be allocated to the support of the public school system as
defined in Article X, Section 2 of this Constitution. (As amended November
6, 1900; November 6,1906; November 4,1930; November 5,1946; November
5, 196S, effective January 1, 1969.)

